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not is very important since a state-contingent loan can provide insurance for bor-
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1 Introduction
The remarkable success of micronance programs in making loans to (and recovering them
from) poor people has received world-wide attention and generated a global micronance
movement which has been growing rapidly. According to the report from the Microcredit
Summit Campaign, as of December 31, 2007, 3,552 microcredit institutions reported
reaching 154,825,825 clients, 106,584,679 of whom were among the poorest when they
took their rst loan.1 The original ideas of micronance are from Muhammad Yunus, the
founder of the Grameen bank and Nobel peace prize laureate in 2006, who started making
small loans to groups of poor people in rural areas in Bangladesh in the 1970s. Today
the Grameen bank is a large nancial organization: according to the monthly report of
February 2009, it disbursed a total of $ 7,776.55 million since inception to about 7.51
millions borrowers with a loan recovery rate of approximately 97.93 percent.2
There exists a large economic literature on micronance and most of it focuses on
how group lending a¤ects adverse selection (Ghatak, 1999, Armendáriz de Aghion and
Gollier 2000, La¤ont and NGuessan 2000, La¤ont, 2003), moral hazard in terms of loan
repayment (Besley and Coate, 1995, Armendáriz de Aghion 1999, Sadoulet 2000, Rai and
Sjöström, 2004), and moral hazard before return realization in terms of work incentives
(Stiglitz 1990, Varian 1990, Conning 1999, Che 2002, La¤ont and Rey, 2003).3 Despite
the variety of the issues that these papers examine, most of them, with a few exceptions
mentioned later on, consider only borrowersincentives and do not study the incentive
issues of the bank sta¤managing the loans. Furthermore, all papers studying the optimal
lending contracts nd that state-contingent repayments are optimal, where a state refers
to a realized return of a borrowers project. This nding is in stark contrast with the
practice of the classic Grameen bank, which species a rigid repayment schedule that
does not depend on the realization of the state of nature.4 The Grameen banks practice
is very puzzling since it means that poor borrowers of the Grameen bank make their
payments even under hard circumstances. This paper tries to explain the puzzle.
1See https://promujer.org/empowerment/dynamic/our_publications_5_Pdf_EN_SOCR2009%20English.pdf
accessed on Feb. 8, 2010.
2See http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=453&Itemid=527
3See Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Morduch (1999) for surveys. The book written by Armendáriz
de Aghion and Morduch (2005) also reviews some recent papers that focus on other issues such as dynamic
incentives, competition, the use of collateral, etc.
4Yunus (1998, p.110) describes the repayment mechanism of the Grameen bank as: (i) one year loan
(ii) equal weekly installments (iii) repayment starts one week after the loan etc. In section 7, we discuss
the transition from Grameen I (the classic Grameen) to Grameen II.
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Whether a micronance institution should use a state-contingent loan or not is an ex-
tremely important issue since a state-contingent loan can provide insurance to borrowers
by linking repayments to the success or failure of their projects.5 However, the spectacular
growth of micronance institutions raises the issue of sta¤s quality and their misbehav-
ior.6 In particular, when a loan is state-contingent, a sta¤ member managing the loan
might manipulate his7 report to the lender in order to embezzle some repayments. In this
paper, we study the optimal lending contract and the optimal supervisory contract when
a sta¤ member (called a supervisor) can embezzle repayments by misrepresenting the
realized state. More precisely, we identify the condition determining whether the optimal
repayment is state-contingent or not and analyze how the mode of lending (group versus
individual lending) a¤ects the condition.
Given that embezzlement and corruption are very frequent in most organizations in
underdeveloped countries,8 incentive schemes in micronance institutions should be de-
signed to reduce the scope for such misconduct of sta¤. In particular, in the case of
micronancing programs in poor countries, most borrowers are illiterate and means of
transportation are primitive; therefore, they get informed about the loan conditions ex-
clusively through the bank sta¤ member who visits their villages to collect repayments.
This creates signicant scope for the sta¤s misconduct and embezzlement, as is docu-
mented by Bornstein (1996)9 and Mknelly and Kevane (2002).10
We consider a simple model of hierarchy: there are a lender, a supervisor and two
borrowers. The lender maximizes the borrowerspayo¤s subject to her own break-even
constraint. The supervisor must check the success or failure of the project undertaken by
each borrower and collect the repayments. We assume that the supervisor can discover the
5For instance, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand uses
state-contingent repayments in that a nonrepayment can be rescheduled if it is due to force majeur, but
is penalized otherwise. (Townsend and Yaron, 2001, p.36). See also the discussion of Grameen II in
section 7.
6Bazoberry (2001, p.13) describes six unauthorized activities that sta¤members of some micronance
organizations in Bolivia engaged in, such as creation of ghostloans to hide the fact that goals are not
met, utilization of inactive saving accounts to pay for outstanding debts, etc. Bond and Rai (2002) give
several examples of supervisor frauds around the world.
7We use shefor the lender, and hefor the sta¤ member (i.e., the supervisor) and for a borrower.
8For instance, Angolan o¢ cials are accused of embezzling 10 percent of the countrys GDP. (Fantaye,
2004, p.173).
9Bornstein writes about embezzlement in the early period of the Grameen bank (pp. 169-174).
10According to Mknelly and Kevane (2002), embezzlement occurs because illiterate borrowers cannot
maintain their account books.
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return realization by visiting the borrowersvillage and can enforce repayments.11 In other
words, we assume that a borrower is able to repay the loan even when the project fails:
although this is a signicant departure from the standard assumption in the micronance
literature, we would like to emphasize that it is consistent with the 98% repayment rate
in the Grameen bank. In addition, we suppose that a borrowers marginal cost of paying
back one unit of money is higher when his project fails than when it succeeds. Therefore,
if the supervisor were honest, the lender would provide full insurance to the borrowers by
recovering all nancing cost only through repayments upon success.
The lender can design either a state non-contingent lending contract in which a bor-
rower makes the same payment regardless of the realization of project returns, or a state-
contingent contract in which the repayment depends on the realization of the return(s):
in the case of individual lending, a borrowers repayment depends only on his own return
while in the case of group lending, a borrowers repayment can depend also on the return
of the other borrower. If the lender uses a state-contingent loan, the supervisor has some
discretion in that, for instance, when a project succeeded, he can report that the project
failed and embezzle the di¤erence between the payment upon success and the payment
upon failure. The lender can use incentive pay and/or audit to induce the supervisor
to behave well, but the supervisor is protected by limited liability: in case auditing re-
veals that embezzlement occurred, the lender can recover the stolen money and re the
supervisor without paying any wage, but the supervisor is not liable for a further ne.12
We rst consider group lending. In this case, the optimal lending contract always pro-
vides some insurance by requiring that only the successful borrower pays when only one
project succeeds. Furthermore, the aggregate repayment is constant (i.e., no discretion
of the supervisor) as long as at least one project succeeds. Let the supervisors discre-
tion refer to the di¤erence between the aggregate repayment when there is at least one
successful project and the one when both projects fail. The optimal supervisory contract
for a given level of discretion is such that it is optimal to use incentive pay only (respec-
tively, audit only) when the amount of discretion is smaller (respectively, larger) than a
threshold level. Optimization with respect to the amount of discretion reveals that zero
11The enforcement can be done through (i) pecuniary punishment such as denial of future loan (chapter
5.2 of Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005) and seizure of income or assets (Besley and Coate,
1995) or (ii) non-pecuniary punishment of being hassledby the bank (Besley and Coate, 1995).
12Note that with unlimited liability, the agency problem can be solved at almost zero cost either by
imposing a ne large enough when embezzlement is discovered or by "selling the rm to the supervisor"
and making the supervisor a residual claimant. We do not think that any of the two is a realistic solution
to the problem.
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discretion (respectively, maximum discretion) is optimal when the amount of discretion is
smaller (respectively, larger) than the threshold. Therefore, the optimal lending contract
involves either zero or the maximum discretion. In the latter case, each borrower makes
a payment only when his project succeeds but the lender should conduct an audit when
the supervisor reports that both projects failed. Hence, the optimal contract is state
non-contingent when the audit cost is larger than the borrowersgain from full insurance.
Furthermore, in the case of individual lending, we nd that the optimal lending con-
tract is also determined by a similar trade-o¤ between the insurance gain and the cost
of controlling misbehavior of the supervisor. However, conditional on that the optimal
contract is state-contingent, the lender nds it optimal to use audit only (respectively,
a mix of audit and incentive pay) if the audit cost is lower (respectively, higher) than a
threshold.
When we compare group lending with individual lending, we nd that the former is
strictly preferred to the latter for two reasons. First, in the case of state non-contingent
loan, group lending provides insurance when only one project fails. Second, in the case of
state-contingent loan, group lending reduces the audit cost since audit occurs only when
both projects fail in the case of group lending while audit occurs when at least a project
fails in the case of individual lending. Therefore, group lending can be regarded as an
optimal response to the embezzlement problem. However, if the borrowers can sign a
side-contract for mutual insurance before return realization, we show that the outcome
of the optimal non-contingent contract under group lending can be achieved also under
individual lending.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on collusion between a supervisor and
an agent in mechanism design theory (Tirole 1986, La¤ont and Tirole 1991, Kofman and
Lawarrée 1993 and Faure-Grimaud, La¤ont and Martimort 2003). This literature derives
the optimal collusion-proof contract when the supervisor can manipulate the information
he reports to the principal about the agents type in exchange for a bribe. We do not
consider collusion13 but focus on the supervisors incentive to unilaterally manipulate his
13Given that collection of repayments in the Grameen bank is done in a village meeting which all the
members (about 40 to 60 people) of a center should attend, a "naked" collusion at the center meeting
among a sta¤member and all the borrowers of the center seems to be unlikely. In addition, collusion with
a subset of borrowers needs to be organized and enforced without documents (since most borrowers are
illiterate) and without being noticed by other borrowers. On the contrary, embezzlement does not require
such an organization and enforcement. For these reasons, embezzlement seems like a more natural issue to
focus on than collusion. However, our model can be used to deal with collusion with minor modications
and our insight is applicable to collusion issue as well (see section 5, Jeon-Menicucci, 2009).
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report to embezzle payments.
Our paper is related to the literature on costly state verication (Townsend 1979, Gale
and Hellwig 1985), in particular the one on delegated monitoring (Diamond 1984), as the
lender can conduct an audit to verify the realized returns reported by the supervisor.
However, there are three major di¤erences. First, in our model, the presence of an inter-
mediary is given, which is natural in the case of the Grameen bank, while delegation to
an intermediary endogenously arises as the optimal structure in Diamond (1984). Second,
since we assume that the two borrowers know the realized return of each others project,
if the lender directly deals with the borrowers without mediation of the supervisor, the
lender can achieve the rst-best outcome by using cross-reporting even when each bor-
rower can manipulate his report.14 Third, while the literature on costly state verication
assumes that a borrower cannot repay the loan in some states of nature and derives the
optimality of a state-contingent contract, we assume that a borrower is able to repay the
loan even when the project fails and study the trade-o¤ between a state-contingent loan
and a state non-contingent one.
In the micronance literature, only a few papers (Conning 1999 and Aubert, Janvry
and Sadoulet 2005) consider a hierarchy but none of them considers embezzlement. For
instance, Conning (1999) studies both a borrowers incentive to divert funds and a sta¤
members incentive to monitor the formers misbehavior but assumes that the realized
return is common knowledge, as many papers on micronance do.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, section 3 analyzes
group lending, section 4 analyzes individual lending and section 5 compares the two.
Section 6 considers individual lending with mutual insurance and section 7 gives conclud-
ing remarks and discusses the transition from Grameen I to Grameen II. All proofs are
gathered in Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a hierarchy composed of a lender, a supervisor and two borrowers. The two
borrowers live in the same village. Each borrower borrows one unit of money from the
lender and invests it in a project. The lender is risk neutral and designs the contracts
to maximize the borrowerspayo¤s under her own break-even constraint. To break even,
she needs to recover the opportunity cost of the loan 2 (> 2) plus the wage bill paid
to the supervisor and the cost of audit (if there is any). For simplicity, we assume that
14The proof is available from the authors upon request.
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the return of each project is identically and independently distributed. Let Y denote the
return from a borrowers project: with probability p 2 (0; 1), the project succeeds and
Y = YS > 0; with probability 1  p, it fails and Y = YF = 0.
We distinguish a group lending contract from an individual lending contract. We as-
sume that the borrowers know the realized return of each others project. A group lending
contract takes the form frSS; rSF ; rFS; rFFg where, for instance, rSF is the payment that
a borrower whose project succeeded has to make when the other borrowers project failed.
An individual lending contract takes the form frS; rFg and a borrowers repayment de-
pends only on the return realization of his own project. Without loss of generality, we
assume rij  0 for i; j = S; F and ri  0 for i = S; F .15
The lender does not ask for any collateral. In the case of failure, however, a borrower
is still able to generate the amount of cash r > 0, but in order to do so he must reduce his
consumption (or sell his assets, or withdraw his children from school, borrow money from
local money lenders charging usurious interest rates16). This is costly in the following
sense: generating r units of money in state F costs  (r) to the borrower, with  (0) = 0,
 0(r) > 1 and  00(r)  0 for any r > 0; hence,  (r) > r for r > 0. Let U(Y; r) denote a
borrowers utility. We assume:
U(Y; r) = Y   r if Y   r  0;
U(Y; r) =   (r   Y ) if Y   r < 0:
Thus, a borrowers marginal utility of one unit of money is 1 if Y   r  0, but it is larger
than 1 if Y   r < 0. This decreasing marginal utility of money makes the borrower risk
averse. We say that the borrowers are fully insured if rF = 0 and rS  YS in the case of
individual lending (if rFj = 0 and rSj  YS for j = S; F in the case of group lending);
then, each borrower makes a payment to the lender only in state S and the marginal utility
from additional money is equal to one regardless of the realized state. When rS  YS, a
borrowers expected payo¤ upon accepting an individual lending contract is given by:
p(YS   rS)  (1  p) (rF ): (1)
The supervisor is the intermediary between the lender and the borrowers. He has
the task to observe and report the return realization of each project to the bank, and to
collect the borrowersrepayments. We assume that the supervisor observes the realized
15We obtain the same results even though rij or ri can be negative (because negative repayments do not
provide more insurance than zero repayments), but considering this possibility makes the proofs longer.
16For instance, Jain and Mansuri (2003) provide evidence of micronance members borrowing money
from local lenders.
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state by visiting each borrower and can enforce the repayment. Since collecting the
repayments anyway requires him to visit the borrowers, we assume that his cost of visiting
the borrowers is zero for simplicity. A supervisory contract species a wage contingent
on the states he reports: let wn represent the supervisors wage when he reports that
n number of projects succeeded, with n 2 f0; 1; 2g. We suppose that the supervisors
wage cannot be lower than a certain minimum wage w  0, which is the supervisors
reservation utility:17 hence, his participation constraint, i.e. wn  w, is trivially satised.
For simplicity, we assume w = 0.18
We focus on the moral hazard of the supervisor, who can misrepresent the realized
states to the lender. For instance, if rSS rFF > 0, by reporting n = 0 when the true n is 2
the supervisor can embezzle 2(rSS rFF ). The lender can audit the actual payments made
by the borrowers at a cost of k(> 0): Since both borrowers live in the same village, the
cost of audit does not depend on whether the lender audits the payment of one borrower
or those of both borrowers.19 When cheating is discovered, the lender can recover the
embezzled repayment, re the supervisor, and refuse to pay him any wage. However,
we assume that the lender cannot impose any further ne on him since the supervisor is
protected by limited liability.20 A supervisory contract is represented by fwn; qngn=0;1;2,
where qn is the probability of conducting an audit when the supervisor reports that n
number of projects succeeded. The supervisor is assumed to be risk-neutral.
A grand-contract is composed of a lending contract frSS; rSF ; rFS; rFFg or frS; rFg and
a supervisory contract fwn; qngn=0;1;2. We assume that the lender makes a take-it-or-leave-
it o¤er to both the supervisor and the borrowers. Let   rS rF , 1  rSF +rFS 2rFF
and 2  2rSS   rSF   rFS. We have two observations:
Observation 1: The set of individual lending contracts is a strict subset of the set
of group lending contracts since the former is equal to the set of group lending contracts
that satisfy rSS = rSF = rS and rFS = rFF = rF (equivalently, 1 = 2 = .)
Observation 2: The rst-best outcome is such that wn = 0; qn = 0 for n = 0; 1; 2
17It is common to assume that the minimum wage is dened with respect to the reservation utility:
La¤ont and Martimort (2002, section 4.8.1).
18Conning (1999) also assumes w = 0. See Jeon-Menicucci (2009) for the analysis of w  0.
19Since the auditor can easily nd out the actual amount paid by a borrower as long as he visits him,
the main cost of audit is the cost of visiting the village and the marginal cost of visiting one more borrower
in the same village is negligible. Even if we assume that the cost of auditing two borrowers is 2k, our
main result would qualitatively hold.
20See footnote 12 for justication.
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and each borrower makes a payment (equal to  in expectation) only when his project is
successful. If the supervisor is honest, it is possible to achieve the rst-best with individual
lending (and, a fortiori, with group lending) by setting prS = , rF = 0 and wn = 0; qn = 0
for n = 0; 1; 2.
For expositional facility, we dene two kinds of lending contracts, depending on whether
or not the contract is state-contingent, and two kinds of supervisory contracts.
Denition 1: An individual lending contract is said to be state non-contingent (re-
spectively, state-contingent) if  = 0 (respectively, otherwise). A group lending contract
is state non-contingent (respectively, state-contingent) if 1 = 2 = 0 (respectively,
otherwise).
Denition 2: A supervisory contract with w2 = w1 = w0 and qn > 0 for some n =
0; 1; 2 is called a supervisory contract with stick. A supervisory contract with q2 = q1 = q0
and (w2   w1)2 > 0 and/or (w1   w0)1 > 021 is called a supervisory contract with
carrot.
In a state non-contingent lending contract, the supervisor has no discretion since
the total payments of the borrowers are constant and do not depend on the realized
states. When a lending contract is state-contingent, the supervisor has some discretion
(represented by n > 0 or  > 0) and the lender can use either stick (i.e. audit) or carrot
(i.e. incentive pay) or a mix of both in order to induce the supervisor to behave well.
We make the following assumption:
A1: (i) pYS >  + (1   p)min

 ()  ; 1+p
2
k
	
and (ii) YS  max1 , where max1 is
dened by
max1 =
2+ (1  p)2k
p(2  p) : (2)
Both A1(i) and A1(ii) require that YS be su¢ ciently large. Precisely, A1(i) implies
that the NPV of the project is positive at the optimal contract, for both group lending and
individual lending. A1(ii) simplies our analysis of the optimal group lending contract in
that rFS = 0 becomes optimal.
21Obviously, in the case of individual lending, (w2   w1) > 0 and/or (w1   w0) > 0 replaces
(w2   w1)2 > 0 and/or (w1   w0)1 > 0.
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3 Group lending
In this section we consider group lending. By the revelation principle, there is no loss
of generality in restricting our attention to direct and truthful revelation mechanisms.
Therefore, the following incentive constraints for the supervisor to truthfully reveal the
states need to be satised:
(ICnbn) wn  (1  qbn) [R(n) R(bn) + wbn] for (n; bn) 2 f0; 1; 2g2 ; (3)
where R(2)  2rSS, R(1)  rSF + rFS, R(0)  2rFF are the aggregate payments of
borrowers in di¤erent states. Recall that if the embezzlement is discovered, then the
supervisor receives nothing as he loses both the embezzled money and his wage. The
lenders break-even constraint is given by
(BE) p22rSS + 2p(1  p) (rSF + rFS) + (1  p)22rFF
 2+ p2(w2 + kq2) + 2p(1  p)(w1 + kq1) + (1  p)2(w0 + kq0);
where the right hand side represents the total nancing cost of the loans. The lenders
program, denoted by
 
LG

, is dened as follows:
max p2 (2YS   2rSS) + 2p(1  p) (YS   rSF    (rFS))  (1  p)22 (rFF )
with respect to rSS; rSF ; rFS; rFF ; and fwn; qngn=0;1;2
subject to
(3), (BE), rij  0 for i; j = S; F , wn  0 for n = 0; 1; 2:
Note that in the objective function of (LG) we assume rSF  YS and rSS  YS, which
in the proof of Proposition 1 we verify to be satised under A1. In what follows, we
identify the optimal contract by focusing on the case with 1  0 and 2  0, but at the
end of this section, in Lemma 3, we show that the optimal contract satises 1  0 and
2  0.
Our next lemma presents one important property of group lending:
Lemma 1 In the case of group lending, the optimal rFS is equal to zero if YS is su¢ ciently
large.
Lemma 1 says that when only one borrower is successful, it is optimal that the un-
successful borrower pays nothing: rFS = 0. The reason is that requiring the unsuccessful
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borrower to pay a positive amount forces him to reduce his consumption, which is more
costly than requiring the successful borrower to pay for both. Therefore, group lending
provides borrowers with insurance when only one project is successful. Clearly, the re-
sulting rSF is relatively high and this approach is viable only if the successful borrower
has enough money to pay rSF ; the proof of Proposition 1 shows that rSF  YS holds in
the optimal contract under A1.
Given 1  0 and 2  0, it is intuitive that the supervisor has no incentive to report
a state bn larger than n. Accordingly, we consider a relaxed problem  LrG in which the
upward incentive constraints (IC02); (IC01); (IC12) are neglected and only the following
downward incentive constraints are imposed:8><>:
(IC21) w2  (1  q1)(2 + w1);
(IC20) w2  (1  q0)(2 +1 + w0);
(IC10) w1  (1  q0)(1 + w0):
(4)
In the proof of Proposition 1 we show that (IC02); (IC01); (IC12) are satised in the solution
of the relaxed problem, thus the solution of
 
LrG

is also a solution of
 
LG

.
The next lemma establishes some properties of the solution of (LrG).
Lemma 2 The solution to the relaxed problem (LrG) is such that
(i) (BE) binds, w0 = 0, q1 = q2 = 0, and 2 = 0;
(ii) all the constraints in (4) bind, hence w1 = w2 = (1  q0)1.
The results of this lemma are quite relevant for the shape of the optimal contract, but
are also pretty intuitive. First, there is no reason to give any reward to the supervisor
when he reports n = 0: he is transferring the lowest possible amount of money to the
lender, and so w0 = 0. Second, when the supervisor reports n = 2 there is no reason
to conduct an audit: he is transferring the highest possible amount of money to the
lender, and so q2 = 0. Third, it pays to have 2 = 0 because 2 > 0 generates some
embezzlement opportunities for the supervisor, and by reducing 2, and simultaneously
increasing 1, it is possible to reduce the cost of auditing in states FS and SF and/or
the wage bill (notice that in view of Lemma 1, an increase in 1 does not increase the
payment of an unsuccessful borrower). Finally, 2 = 0 implies w1 = w2 and that no
auditing occurs in states SF and FS.
As a consequence of Lemma 2, only q0 and 1 need to be determined in order to nd
the solution to (LrG). To this purpose, we perform a two-step analysis: we rst nd the
optimal q0 for any given 1  0, and then we identify the optimal 1.
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Given an arbitrary value of 1  0, q0 a¤ects only the total nancing cost, which is
2+ p2(1  q0)1 + 2p(1  p)(1  q0)1 + (1  p)2kq0. Since this cost is linear in q0, it is
straightforward to nd q0 which minimizes the cost: After dening 1  (1 p)2p(2 p)k, we nd
that the minimum is achieved at q0 = 0 if 1  1 (respectively, at q0 = 1 if 1 > 1).
In the rst case the optimal supervisory contract uses carrot only such that q0 = 0 and
w2 = w1 = 1. In the second case, 1 is large enough and this makes the carrot approach
too expensive: the optimal supervisory contract uses stick only such that q0 = 1 and
w2 = w1 = 0. Let CG(1) denote the total nancing cost when the supervisory contract
is chosen optimally:
CG(1) =
(
2+ p(2  p)1 if 1 2 [0; 1];
2+ (1  p)2k if 1 > 1:
In order to derive the optimal lending contract, we recall that rFS = 0 (by Lemma
1) and 2 = 0 [by Lemma 2(i)], which implies rSF = 2rSS = 1 + 2rFF . Therefore, the
lenders program can be written as
max10;rFF0 2pYS   p(2  p)(2rFF +1)  (1  p)22 (rFF )
subject to (BE) 2rFF + p(2  p)1 = CG(1)
Consider rst the carrot regime, that is 1 2 [0; 1]. Then (BE) is equivalent to
rFF = , and increasing 1 above zero has the only e¤ect of increasing the nancing
cost (through increased wages) without improving any insurance provision. Therefore it
is optimal to choose 1 = 0 in the carrot regime; the resulting contract does not leave
any embezzlement opportunity and therefore neither carrot nor stick is necessary.
Consider now the stick regime, that is 1  1. Then (BE) is equivalent to
rFF = +
1
2
(1  p)2k   1
2
p(2  p)1( rFF (1)): (5)
Since rFF (1) must be non-negative and decreases in 1 with rFF (max1 ) = 0 [
max
1 is
introduced in (2)], we need to maximize
2pYS   p(2  p)[2rFF (1) + 1]  (1  p)22 [rFF (1)]
with respect to 1 2 [ 1;max1 ]. Here an increase in 1 does not a¤ect the total nancing
cost (which is constant) but shifts the payments of each borrower from the state FF to
other states without altering each borrowers expected payment. Since increasing 1
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provides more insurance without a¤ecting the nancing cost, it is optimal to choose the
highest 1, that is 1 = max1 , to provide full insurance (i.e. rFF = 0).
The above analysis reveals that the optimal lending contract is either a state-contingent
contract with 2rSS = rSF + rFS > 2rFF = 0 or a state non-contingent contract with
2rSS = rSF + rFS = 2rFF . Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 1 Consider group lending. Under A1,
(i) the optimal grand contract is the best contract between the two following contracts:
a. A state non-contingent lending contract f2rSS = 2rFF = rSF = 2, rFS = 0g with
fq0 = q1 = q2 = 0; w0 = w1 = w2 = 0g;
b. A state-contingent lending contract providing full insurance frFS = rFF = 0,
rSF = 2rSS =
2+(1 p)2k
p(2 p) g combined with audit in state FF : fq0 = 1, q1 = q2 = 0;
w0 = w1 = w2 = 0g.
(ii) The state non-contingent contract is optimal if and only if k  2[ ()  ].
A state non-contingent contract provides insurance only when at least one project
succeeds, and thus each borrower bears the cost of reducing his own consumption only
when both projects fail. On the contrary, a state-contingent contract provides insurance
for all states of the world, but auditing is necessary when both projects fail in order to
deter embezzlement. Therefore, the state-contingent contract is optimal when the audit
cost (1  p)2k is larger than the gain from providing both borrowers with full insurance,
(1  p)22[ ()  ], as Proposition 1(ii) states.
Finally, the following lemma shows that there is no loss of generality in restricting
attention to contracts with 1  0 and 2  0 as we have done in this section.22
Lemma 3 In the case of group lending, under A1, the optimal lending contract satises
1  0 and 2  0:
4 Individual lending
In the case of individual lending we have rSS = rSF = rS and rFS = rFF = rF , which
implies 1 = 2  . In order to see the e¤ects of this restriction, we recall that under
group lending it is optimal to set rFS = 0 (Lemma 1). Under individual lending, however,
rFS = 0 implies rFF = 0 and therefore, for instance, the state non-contingent group
22The lemma is stated here because its proof is easier to read with the knowledge of the analysis for
the case with 1  0 and 2  0.
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lending contract described by Proposition 1(i)a is not feasible. Notice also that while it
is always optimal to set 2 = 0 under group lending [Lemma 2(i)], no similar result holds
with individual lending because 2 = 0 implies 1 = 0. In particular, we can show that
there is no loss of generality in considering only the case   0.
Lemma 4 The optimal contract under individual lending is such that   0.
The intuition for this result is that if rS < rF , then increasing the payment in state S
and decreasing the payment in state F without modifying the expected payment relaxes
the incentive constraints for the supervisor and increases the borrowers expected utility
given that  0(r) > 1.
The lenders problem under individual lending is dened as
max 2[pYS   prS   (1  p) (rF )]
with respect to rS  0; rF  0; and fwn; qngn=0;1;2
subject to
(ICnbn) wn  (1  qbn)[(n  bn) + wbn] for (n; bn) 2 f0; 1; 2g2 ; (6)
(BE) 2prS + 2(1  p)rF
 2+ p2(w2 + kq2) + 2p(1  p)(w1 + kq1) + (1  p)2(w0 + kq0)
wn  0 for n = 0; 1; 2
Also in this setting we consider the relaxed problem in which the upward incentive
constraints (IC02), (IC01), (IC12) are neglected, and then we verify that the solution to
the relaxed problem is the solution to the complete problem. The incentive constraints
for the relaxed problem are8><>:
(IC21) w2  (1  q1)( + w1);
(IC20) w2  (1  q0)(2 + w0);
(IC10) w1  (1  q0)( + w0);
(7)
We apply again a two-step procedure as follows: given any   0, rst we nd the
optimal supervisory contract by minimizing the total nancing cost. Then this result is
used to nd the optimal . Next lemma describes the optimal supervisory contract as a
function of .
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Lemma 5 For any given   0, the optimal supervisory contract is described as follows
contract : (q0; q1; q2) = (0; 0; 0) and (w0; w1; w2) = (0;; 2) if   (1 p)2p(2 p)k;
contract : (q0; q1; q2) = (1; 0; 0) and (w0; w1; w2) = (0; 0;) if
(1 p)2
p(2 p)k <   2(1 p)p k;
contract : (q0; q1; q2) = (1; 1; 0) and (w0; w1; w2) = (0; 0; 0) if
2(1 p)
p
k < .
The intuition for this lemma is quite simple. For a small  it is better to pay an
incentive pay to the supervisor, with rewards proportional to , rather than incurring
the audit costs; then contract , a contract which uses carrot only, is optimal. For a high
, on the contrary, the supervisor has a large incentive to embezzle funds and therefore
auditing is the cheapest way to deter embezzlement; then contract , which uses stick
only, is optimal. For intermediate values of , a mix of carrot and stick as described in
contract  is optimal: More precisely, the stick q0 = 1 is optimal in order to prevent the
supervisor from misrepresenting n = 2 or n = 1 as n = 0 while the carrot w2 w1 =  is
optimal in order to prevent the supervisor from misrepresenting n = 2 as n = 1.
Let CI() denote the minimal nancing cost as a function of . Lemma 5 implies
that
CI() =
8><>:
2+ 2p if   (1 p)2
p(2 p)k
2+ (1  p)2k + p2 if (1 p)2
p(2 p)k <   2(1 p)p k
2+ (1  p2)k if 2(1 p)
p
k < 
(8)
(BE) is written as 2rF +2p = CI(), or equivalently as rF = 12C
I() p  rF ().
Direct inspection of (8) reveals that there exists a (unique) value of , denoted by maxI ,
such that rF ()  0 if and only if  2 [0;maxI ]. The value of maxI depends on the sign
of 2 (1 p)(3 p)k,23 and in the following we assume 2 > (1 p)(3 p)k (the opposite
case is considered in Remark 1 below); thus maxI =
2+(1 p2)k
2p
and maxI >
2(1 p)
p
k.
The optimal  is found by solving
max
2[0;maxI ]
2pYS   2p[1
2
CI()  p+]  2(1  p) [1
2
CI()  p]: (9)
Let B() denote the objective function in (9). It turns out that B() is decreasing
when  belongs to the interval [0; (1 p)
2
p(2 p)k], is increasing when  belongs to the inter-
val [2(1 p)
p
k;maxI ], and has a non-straightforward monotonicity (and is concave) when
 belongs to the middle interval ( (1 p)
2
p(2 p)k;
2(1 p)
p
k] because increasing  in this interval
increases the nancing cost but also provides some insurance by reducing rF . Because of
23Precisely, maxI =
2+(1 p)2k
p(1 p) and
(1 p)2
p(2 p)k < 
max
I  2(1 p)p k if 2  (1   p)(3   p)k, while maxI =
2+(1 p2)k
2p and 
max
I >
2(1 p)
p k if 2 > (1  p)(3  p)k.
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these features, a closed-form solution cannot be obtained without further assumptions;
thus we consider the case of linear  , that is  (r) = r with  > 1. Since it turns out that
CI is concave, when  is linear we obtain that B() is convex and so the optimal  is ei-
ther 0 or Imax. In other terms, the optimal lending contract is either state non-contingent
(i.e.,  = 0) or has the maximal , and thus rF = 0, rS = maxI . We have:
Proposition 2 Consider individual lending. Assume A1, 2 > (1   p)(3   p)k and
 (r) = r with  > 1.
(i) Then the optimal grand contract is the best one between the two following contracts:
a. A state non-contingent lending contract frS = rF = g with fq0 = q1 = q2 = 0,
w0 = w1 = w2 = 0g (contract );
b. A state-contingent lending contract frS = 2+(1 p2)k2p ; rF = 0g with fq0 = q1 = 1;
q2 = 0, w0 = w1 = w2 = 0g (contract ).
(ii) The state non-contingent contract is optimal if and only if (1 + p)k  2[ ()  ].
The result in Proposition 2 is consistent with Proposition 1 since it depends on a similar
trade-o¤ between insurance gain and audit cost. However, we notice that this result relies
on the assumption that  is linear, otherwise it may occur that under individual lending
the optimal contract is such that rS > rF > 0, a feature which does not appear in the
contracts of Proposition 2.24
Remark 1 When (1  p)(3  p)k > 2 holds, we nd maxI = 2+(1 p)
2k
p(2 p) and the optimal
grand contract is either the state non-contingent one described in Proposition 2(i)a or a
state-contingent one frS = maxI ; rF = 0g with fq0 = 1, q1 = q2 = 0 , w0 = w1 = 0; w2 =
maxI (the supervisory contract is  with  = 
max
I ). The state non-contingent contract
is optimal if and only if p+ (1  p)2k  (1  p)(2  p)[ ()  ].
It is interesting to observe that when (1  p)(3  p)k > 2 holds, it is optimal to use
a mix of audit and incentive pay when the optimal lending contract is state-contingent.
24For instance consider  (r) = r + 3r2 with p = 12 , k = 1,  =
2
3 . Then 
max
I =
25
12 and we have
CI() =
8><>:
4
3 + if   13
19
12 +
1
4 if
1
3    2
25
12 if 2  
and B() =
8><>:
YS   83   if   13
YS   665192 + 4932  27642 if 13    2
YS   1025192 + 258   342 if 2    2512
In the interval [ 13 ; 2], B() is maximized at =
49
27 withB(
49
27 ) = YS  5627 . Furthermore, B(0) = YS  83 and
B( 2512 ) = YS   2512 . Since 5627 < 2512 and 5627 < 83 , the optimal lending contract is rF = 12CI( 4927 )  12  4927 = 327 ,
rS = rF +
49
27 =
52
27 , with supervisory contract : (q0; q1; q2) = (1; 0; 0) and (w0; w1; w2) = (0; 0;
49
27 ).
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5 Comparison: group versus individual lending
The following table summarizes the total NPV when  is linear and 2  (1   p)(3  
p)k under the optimal state non-contingent or state-contingent contract, depending on
whether the lender uses group or individual lending.
Lending Optimal state non-contingent contract Optimal state-contingent contract
Group V   (1  p)22( ()  ) V   (1  p)2k
Individual V   [(1  p)2 + p(1  p)] 2( ()  ) V   [(1  p)2 + 2p(1  p)] k
where V  2pYS   2 represents the NPV when the supervisor is honest.
Conditional on that the lender uses the optimal state non-contingent contract, or the
optimal state-contingent contract, the change from individual lending to group lending
strictly increases the NPV. In the case of the optimal state non-contingent contract,
group lending provides a partial insurance in that when only one project succeeds, the
borrower whose project failed does not pay anything (i.e. rFS = 0) while there is no such
insurance under individual lending. In the case of the optimal state-contingent contract,
full insurance is provided by both types of lending. However, the audit cost is lower
under group lending: by making the borrowersaggregate repayment when both projects
succeed equal to the one when only one succeeds, the lender needs to conduct audit only
when both projects fail. By contrast, under individual lending, the lender should conduct
audit whenever at least one project fails.
Summarizing, we have
Proposition 3 Assume A1, 2 > (1  p)(3  p)k and  (r) = r with  > 1.
(i) When the supervisor is honest, group lending does not increase the borrowerspayo¤
with respect to individual lending.
(ii) When the supervisor can misbehave, group lending strictly dominates individual lend-
ing since it either reduces the audit cost or provides borrowers with more insurance.
6 Mutual insurance
Up to now, we have not considered the possibility that the two borrowers can sign a side-
contract between themselves, while some related literature considers side-contracting.25
In our model, the borrowers might have an interest to sign a side-contract to provide
25See La¤ont and NGuessan (2000), La¤ont (2003), La¤ont and Rey (2003), and Rai and Sjöström
(2004)
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mutual insurance. More precisely, consider the timing in which, after accepting the lending
contract and before the realization of the state of nature, the borrowers sign a binding
side-contract which species a state-contingent side-payment between themselves. Since
the lending contract and the agents are symmetric, a side-contract does not need to
specify any side-payment when both projects succeed or both fail. Hence, a side-contract
only species a monetary transfer x that a borrower whose project succeeds makes to a
borrower whose project fails such that the latter uses x to make his repayment to the
lender. Note rst that given a grand-contract, side-contracting has no impact on the
supervisors incentives since it does not a¤ect the borrowersaggregate payment schedule.
Consider rst group lending. Then, we can show that the optimal grand-contract
without side-contracting that we characterized in proposition 1 is still the optimal contract
even though the borrowers can sign a side-contract. Indeed, the only instrument of the
borrowerscoalition is x but this instrument is useless since the optimal contract species
rFS = 0.
Consider now individual lending. First, we note that the outcomes that the lender
can achieve under individual lending are a subset of the outcomes achievable under group
lending regardless of whether or not the borrowers can sign a side-contract. Therefore,
the lender cannot obtain under individual lending an outcome superior to the best she can
achieve under group lending. Second, if side-contracting is possible, the lender can achieve
the outcome of the optimal state non-contingent group lending contract by o¤ering the
following individual lending contract GI = frS = rF = ; wn = 0; qn = 0 for n = 0; 1; 2g.
Under GI, it is optimal for the borrowers to sign a side-contract specifying x = 
because it maximizes the borrowers ex ante expected payo¤s. Last, under individual
lending, side-contracting does not allow the lender to achieve the outcome of the optimal
state-contingent group lending contract in proposition 1(i)b. The latter contract species
a repayment schedule such that 2rSS = rSF , rFS = rFF = 0. This kind of schedule cannot
be obtained under individual lending because rSS = rSF and rFS = rFF must hold. As
the table in section 5 reveals, the consequence is a higher audit cost under individual
lending. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 4 (i) Under group lending, the optimal grand-contract is the same regard-
less of whether or not the borrowers can sign a side-contract and the possibility of side-
contracting has no impact on their payo¤s.
(ii) When the borrowers can sign a side-contract,
a. the borrowerspayo¤s cannot be higher under individual lending than under group
lending.
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b. If a state non-contingent contract is optimal under group lending, the maximal
payo¤s under group lending can be achieved also under individual lending by a grand-
contact which induces the borrowers to sign a side-contract for mutual insurance.
c. If a state-contingent contract is optimal under group lending, the borrowerspayo¤s
are strictly higher under group lending than under individual lending.
Proposition 4(ii)b implies that, conditional on that a state non-contingent contract is
optimal, our model does not necessarily predict that we should observe the use of group
lending.
7 Concluding remarks: transition from Grameen I to
Grameen II
Our paper studied the question of when it is optimal for a micronance institution to use
a state non-contingent repayment by focusing on the bank sta¤s incentive to embezzle
borrowersrepayments. We found that if the optimal lending contract is state-contingent,
in the case of group lending it is optimal to induce a sta¤member to behave well by using
only audit even though a mix of audit and incentive pay can be used, whereas in the
case of individual lending a mix of both instruments become optimal for moderately large
audit cost. Therefore, a state non-contingent schedule is optimal if the cost of monitoring
the sta¤s behavior is larger than the borrowers gain from full insurance. When the
optimal lending contract is state non-contingent, group lending is preferred to individual
lending because the former provides borrowers with partial insurance. However, under
individual lending, the borrowers themselves have an incentive to mutually provide such
an insurance; then, individual lending is as good as group lending. When the optimal
lending contract is state-contingent, we showed that group lending is strictly preferred to
individual lending because the former allows to save audit cost.
Actually, the lending contract under Grameen I, the classic Grameen bank, specied
a state non-contingent individual loan with joint liability26 but the bank discontinued the
26More generally, an individual lending contract with joint liability can be dened as the lending
contract in which the repayment schedule of each borrower of a group depends only on the return
realization of his own project but each borrower is responsible for the repayment of the other borrowers in
the group in case of default. Hence, joint liability can trigger a repayment game among the borrowers as
in Besley-Coate (1995). Our group lending contract is more general than the individual lending contract
with joint liability since the former includes the latter as a subset and in addition the former can specify
a repayment schedule that depends on the return realization of all group membersprojects.
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practice of joint liability after its transition to Grameen II. More precisely, Dowla and
Barua (2006) describe the transition, which was triggered by the ood of 1998, the worst
in the history of Bangladesh, that made many borrowers unable to make repayments. This
transition is characterized by the switch from the rigid repayment schedule to exible ones
that allow for rescheduling, the switch from joint liability to no joint liability, and new
emphasis on voluntary saving in individual account.
The Grameen bank was forced to allow for rescheduling after the ood, otherwise there
would have been massive defaults. However, Grameen II does not distinguish common
shocks such as the ood from individual shocks such as disease and shocks on project
return. Common shocks are observable to a third party including the lender and hence
providing insurance against common shocks does not involve any agency cost and is
desirable. For instance, rescheduling loan payments in a region severely a¤ected by the
ood is optimal. On the contrary, providing insurance against individual shocks which
are observable only to the borrowers and the sta¤ member in charge of them, which is
the focus of our paper, can generate agency costs. Our paper suggests that the gain from
providing such an insurance should be carefully weighed against the cost of controlling
sta¤s discretion.
Furthermore, even under Grameen II, most disbursement is made through "the basic
loan" specifying a rigid repayment schedule27. Our paper shows that in this case, joint
liability is not necessary since borrowers have an incentive to provide mutual insurance. In
addition, abandoning joint liability seems to be caused by the Grameen banks transfor-
mation as a saving (and lending) institution as well as its decision to introduce exibility
to reschedule repayments. For instance, when members of a group have di¤erent saving
levels, the burden of joint liability becomes asymmetric and hence creates a tension, which
in turn reduces incentives to save.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Let R(1) be given, which means that rSF + rFS is given. We prove that if YS  R(1),
then it is optimal to set rFS = 0 and thus rSF = R(1). Since R(1) is given, (rSF ; rFS)
21
does not a¤ect (3) nor (BE) but a¤ects the borrowerspayo¤ only through the term
2p(1  p)[YS   rSF    (rFS)] = 2p(1  p)[YS  R(1) + rFS    (rFS)] (10)
in which the equality comes from rSF = R(1) rFS. In writing (10), we implicitly assumed
that rSF  YS. As long as this condition holds, maximizing (10) with respect to rFS tells
us that any rFS > 0 is dominated by rFS = 0 since  
0(r) > 1 for any r > 0. We prove
in Proposition 1 that the inequality rSF  YS is satised in the optimal lending contract
given that A1(ii) holds.28
Proof of Lemma 2
Step 1 If G is such that (BE) is slack, then it is possible to increase the objective function;
thus the solution to the relaxed problem (LrG) is such that (BE) binds. Moreover, w0 = 0
and q2 = 0.
Proof If (BE) does not bind in the solution to (LrG), then we can nd an alternative
grand contract with reduced borrowerspayments, unchanged wages, and unchanged audit
probabilities, which yields a higher value for the objective function. Precisely, in each of
the following cases we reduce the borrowerspayments in a way that (i) satises (4) [given
that (4) was satised initially]; (ii) leaves the right hand side of (BE) unchanged and
reduces slightly the left hand side of (BE), thus leaving (BE) satised as (BE) was slack
initially; (iii) increases the borrowerspayo¤ since their payments are lower.
In case that rFF > 0, consider rFF =  ", rSS =  " and either rSF =  2" or
rFS =  2" (at least one between rSF and rFS is positive), for " > 0 and small: In this
way (4) is una¤ected. In case that rFF = 0, we examine two sub-cases. If rSF + rFS > 0,
consider rSF =  2" or rFS =  2" (at least one between rSF and rFS is positive) and
rFF = 0, rSS =  ": In this way 2 is unchanged and 1 is reduced, thus relaxing (4).
In case that rFF = 0 and rSF + rFS = 0, then consider rSF = rFS = rFF = 0 and
rSS =  ": In this way 2 is reduced and 1 is unchanged, thus weakly relaxing (4).
In (LrG), (a) q2 appears only in the right hand side of (BE) and q2 = 0 relaxes (BE) most;
(b) w0 appears only in the right hand side of (BE) and in (4), and w0 = 0 relaxes these
constraints most.
Step 2 The solution to (LrG) is such that both (IC21) and (IC10) bind.
28Furthermore, if we allow for rFS < 0 then (10) becomes 2p(1   p)[YS   R(1)] and does not depend
on rFS . However, since rSF = R(1)   rFS , a negative rFS makes rSF larger than R(1) and it is more
di¢ cult to satisfy rSF  YS .
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Proof Constraint (IC10) binds since (a) the right hand side of (IC10) is non negative and
satisfying (IC10) implies that w1  0 holds; (b) reducing w1 reduces the nancing cost
and relaxes (IC21).
Regarding (IC21), notice that if (IC21) is slack then q1 = 0, because when q1 > 0 it
is protable and feasible to reduce q1 in order to relax (BE) and increase the objective
function. Thus w2 > 2 + w1 needs to hold and there are two cases to consider: when
(IC20) binds and when (IC20) is slack. If (IC20) binds, then we have w2 = (1   q0)2 +
(1   q0)1 and hence w2 > 2 + w1 fails to hold because w1 = (1   q0)1. If (IC20) is
slack, then it is protable and feasible to reduce w2 in order to relax (BE) and increase
the objective function, contradicting optimality.
Step 3 The solution to (LrG) is such that 2 = 0, q1 = 0 and w2 = (1  q0)1.
Proof Suppose that G is a solution to (LrG), so that the results in Steps 1 and 2 hold,
and moreover assume that 2 > 0. We show that there exists G0 which is strictly better
than G and satises 02 < 2. In this way we prove that whenever a lending contract is
such that 2 > 0, we can nd another contract G0 with 02 < 2 which is strictly better
than G. Ultimately, this implies that the optimal contract is such that 2 = 0. We need
to distinguish the case in which (IC20) is slack from the case in which (IC20) binds.
If (IC20) is slack, then we pick G0 such that r0FS = rFS, r
0
SF = rSF+
p
2 p", r
0
SS = rSS  1 p2 p",
r0FF = rFF for a small " > 0, thus 
0
2 = 2 ", 01 = 1+ p2 p" and 02+01 = 2+1 
2(1 p)
2 p ". Moreover, we set w
0
1 = w1 + (1  q0) p2 p", w02 = w2 + (1  q1)[ "+ (1  q0) p2 p"]
and q0n = qn for n = 0; 1; 2. It is simple to see that the objective function has the same
value in G0 as in G since a borrowers payment is unchanged when his project fails, and is
unchanged in expectation when his project is successful. Next we verify that G0 satises
(4) and that (BE) is slack in G0. Then Step 1 implies that the objective function can be
increased by reducing suitably the borrowerspayments.
In order to see that G0 satises (4), we notice that (IC21) and (IC10) are satised in G0
given that they were satised in G; (IC20) holds in G0 as it was slack in G and " > 0
is small. Regarding (BE), the left hand side is unchanged since the borrowersexpected
payment is the same as in G. On the other hand, the change in the expected wage paid
to the supervisor is
2p(1  p)(1  q0) p
2  p"+ p
2(1  q1)[ "+ (1  q0) p
2  p"] (11)
and now we prove that (11) is negative. First notice that from (IC21) binding and (IC20)
slack it follows that (1 q1)[2+(1 q0)1] > (1 q0)(2+1) and thus 1 q1 > 1 q0.
Since  " + (1   q0) p2 p" < 0, we infer that (11) is smaller than 2p(1   p)(1   q0) p2 p" +
23
p2(1  q0)[ "+ (1  q0) p2 p"] =  p
3(1 q0)q0
2 p "  0; therefore (BE) is slack in G0.
If (IC20) binds, then using (IC21) we nd
(1  q1)[2 + (1  q0)1] = (1  q0)(2 +1) (12)
Suppose that q1 = 0. Then (12) reduces to 2+(1  q0)1 = (1  q0)(2+1) and thus
q0 = 0. Therefore w1 = 1, w2 = 1+2 and since rSF = 2rFF+1 and 2rSS = rSF+2,
it turns out that (BE) reduces to rFF = . Then consider G0 such that r0FF = , r
0
FS = 0,
rSF = 2, rSS =  (thus 02 = 
0
1 = 0) and w
0
n = 0, q
0
n = 0 for n = 0; 1; 2. In this way
(4) is satised, (BE) holds with equality and each borrowers payment is the same as in
G when his project fails, but is smaller in expectation when his project is successful; thus
the objective function increases.
Now we consider the case in which q1 2 (0; 1] and from (12) we nd 1  q1  1  q0, which
is equivalent to q0  q1. Consider G0 such that r0FF = rFF , r0FS = rFS, r0SF = rSF + p2 p2,
and r0SS = rSS  1 p2 p2; thus01 = 1+ p2 p2, 02 = 0, 01+02 = 1+ p2 p2. Moreover,
we set w01 = w1 + (1  q0) p2 p2, w02 = w2   (1  q0)2 2p2 p 2 and q02 = 0, q01 = q1   " with
" > 0 and small, q00 = q0. In G
0, the borrowerspayo¤ is the same as in G since the
payment of each borrower is unaltered when his project fails, and his payment in case of
success is unchanged in expectation. Next we verify that G0 satises (4) and that (BE) is
slack in G0. Then Step 1 implies that the objective function can be increased by reducing
suitably the borrowerspayments.
We start by noticing that (4) is satised. This is immediate for (IC10) and (IC20), while
(IC21) reduces to
w2   (1  q0)2  2p
2  p 2  (1  q1 + ")[w1 + (1  q0)
p
2  p2] (13)
Since (IC21) binds in G, we have that w2 = (1  q1)(2+w1) and thus (13) boils down to
[(2  p  q1p)q0   2(1  p)q1]2  "[(2  p)w1 + (1  q0)p2] (14)
In order to see that (14) is satised, notice that if q1 2 (0; 1) then q0  q1 implies
(2   p   q1p)q0   2(1   p)q1  (2   p   q1p)q1   2(1   p)q1 = q1(1   q1)p > 0, and thus
(14) holds since " > 0 is close to zero. If instead q1 = 1, then q0 = 1 by (12) and w1 = 0
given that (IC10) binds in G; then (14) is satised again.
Regarding (BE), we see that (i) the borrowersexpected payment is the same as in G; (ii)
the expected wage bill is the same as in G; (iii) the cost of auditing is reduced as q01 < q1.
Finally, after nding that 2 = 0, from (IC20) we obtain (1  q1)(1  q0)1  (1  q0)1.
If (1 q0)1 > 0, then we obtain q1 = 0; if (1 q0)1 = 0, then q1 could be any number in
[0; 1], but q1 = 0 is optimal to minimize the nancing cost. In either case, w2 = (1 q0)1.
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Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1(i) appears in the text. Proposition 1(ii) follows by comparing
the borrowerspayo¤s in the two contracts described in Proposition 1(i).
It is simple to verify that the neglected upward incentive constraints (IC12), (IC02), (IC01)
are satised by the two contracts in Proposition 1(i).
Furthermore, we verify that YS is large enough, given A1, to make the borrowerspayo¤
positive in the optimal grand contract and to satisfy Lemma 1. First consider the state
non-contingent contract described in (i)a. The borrowers payo¤ with this contract is
2pYS 2 2(1 p)2[ () ] and A1(i) implies that this payo¤ is positive.29 Furthermore,
the condition rSF  YS is satised since rSF = 2 < max1 and A1(ii) requires YS 
max1 . Regarding the state-contingent contract described in (i)b, the borrowerspayo¤
is 2pYS   p(2   p)max1 = 2pYS   2   (1   p)2k which is positive by A1(i). Finally,
rSF = 
max
1 and thus rSF  YS is satised because of A1(ii).
Proof of Lemma 3
We start with a preliminary result which helps prove Lemma 3.
Lemma 6 Consider a lending contract frSS; rSF ; rFS; rFFg such that rFS = 0 and rFF >
0. Next, consider a lending contract fr0SS; r0SF ; r0FS; r0FFg such that r0FS = 0, r0FF < rFF
and such that the borrowersexpected payment is the same in the two contracts. Then the
borrowerspayo¤ is larger with the second contract
Proof. Let C  p22rSS+2p(1 p)rSF+(1 p)22rFF = p22r0SS+2p(1 p)r0SF+(1 p)22r0FF
denote the borrowersexpected payment under either contract. The borrowerspayo¤with
frSS; rSF ; rFS; rFFg is 2pYS   C + (1   p)22rFF   (1   p)22 (rFF ), and is decreasing in
r0FF since  
0(r) > 1 for any r > 0. Given that r0FF < rFF , it follows that borrowers prefer
fr0SS; r0SF ; r0FS; r0FFg to frSS; rSF ; rFS; rFFg.
Now we prove Lemma 3 by considering all the possible cases in which 1 < 0 and/or
2 < 0: In any such case we prove that it is possible to increase (weakly) the borrowers
payo¤ by satisfying 1  0 and 2  0. In particular, we need to consider four di¤erent
regimes.
1. R(0)  maxfR(1); R(2)g: regime B.
29Notice that A1 is more restrictive than needed for the case of group lending because we want the
same assumption to cover the case of individual lending as well.
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Let GB denote the best grand contract within the set of grand contracts satisfying R(0) 
R(1) and R(0)  R(2). We show that GB = G0, with R0(0) = R0(1) = R0(2) = 2 and
w00 = w
0
1 = w
0
2 = 0, q
0
0 = q
0
1 = q
0
2 = 0; thus, G
B satises 1  0 and 2  0. It is
easy to see that G0 is feasible because it satises (3) and (BE). The borrowerspayo¤
in G0 is 2pYS   p2R0(2)   2p(1   p)R0(1)   (1   p)22 (R0(0)2 ) because A1(ii) implies that
YS > R
0(1) = 2 and thus Lemma 1 applies. The borrowerspayo¤with a grand contract
G such that R(0) > maxfR(1); R(2)g or R(0) = maxfR(1); R(2)g > minfR(1); R(2)g
is smaller than payo¤ with G0 because of the following arguments. First, suppose for
the moment that the borrowers expected payment is the same in G as in G0. Then
G0 is better than G because of Lemma 6, given that R0(0) = R0(1) = R0(2) implies
R(0) > R0(0). Second, the expected payment in G is actually larger than in G0 because
R(0) = R(1) = R(2) fails to hold and therefore the nancing cost is larger than 2
since some cost must be borne to discourage embezzlement. Third, while YS  R0(1)
holds, it may be that YS < R(1) and in this case borrowers face some cost from reducing
consumption in states SF and FS and not only in state FF .
2. R(2)  R(0)  R(1): regime C.
We show that within the set of grand contracts satisfying R(2)  R(0)  R(1), the best
contract GC is such that RC(0) = RC(1) and therefore 1  0 and 2  0 are satised.
Let 20  R(2)   R(0)  0 and 01  R(0)   R(1)  0. We study the following
relaxed program in which we consider only (IC21), (IC20) and (IC01) among the incentive
constraints: 8><>:
(IC21) w2  (1  q1)(20 +01 + w1)
(IC20) w2  (1  q0)(20 + w0)
(IC01) w0  (1  q1)(01 + w1)
(15)
We prove that GC is such thatC01 = 0 by showing that starting from any feasible contract
G satisfying01 > 0, we can nd G0which is strictly better than G and such that001 = 0.
Precisely, let w0n = wn, q
0
n = qn for n = 0; 1; 2 and R
0(1) = R(1) + [p2 + (1   p)2]01,
R0(2) = R(2)   2p(1   p)01, R0(0) = R(0)   2p(1   p)01; then 001 = 0 < 01 and
020 = 20. As a consequence, the incentive constraints in (15) are weakly relaxed and the
borrowersexpected payment is unchanged; thus G0 satises (BE) and (15), given that G
is feasible. Furthermore, R0(1) > R(1) and R0(0) < R(0) and thus Lemmas 1 and 6 imply
that the borrowerspayo¤ is higher in G0 than in G as long as YS  R0(1). This proves
that GC is such thatC01 = 0 as long as R
C(1)  YS. Now we characterize a few properties
of GC under the assumption that YS is large enough and then verify that YS  RC(1)
given A1(ii). When 01 = 0 and 20  0 it is optimal to set (i) q2 = 0, w1 = 0 (we can
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argue like in the proof of Step 1 in the proof of Lemma 2), w0 = 0 because the right hand
side of (IC01) is 0; (ii) q1 = q0 = q because if q1 > q0 (for instance), then (IC20) binds,
(IC21) is slack and it is protable to reduce q1 slightly in other to reduce the audit cost
kq1 without a¤ecting w2. Then (IC21) is equivalent to (IC20) and w2 = (1  q)20. From
(BE) binding we nd R(1) + p220 = 2 + p2(1   q)20 + (1   p2)kq. The right hand
side, that is the nancing cost, is linear in q and thus is minimized with respect to q at
q = 0 or at q = 1. In either case we nd R(1)  2 and A1(ii) implies that 2 is smaller
than YS. Finally, given w2 = (1   q)20, the incentive constraints neglected in (15) are
satised and we have proved that GC satises 01 = 0.
3. R(1)  R(2)  R(0): regime D.
We show that within the set of grand contracts satisfying R(1)  R(2)  R(0), the best
contract GD is such that RD(1) = RD(2), and therefore it satises 1  0 and 2  0.
Let 12  R(1) R(2)  0 and 20  R(2) R(0)  0. We study a relaxed program in
which we consider only (IC12), (IC10) and (IC20) among the incentive constraints:8><>:
(IC12) w1  (1  q2)(12 + w2)
(IC10) w1  (1  q0)(12 +20 + w0)
(IC20) w2  (1  q0)(20 + w0)
(16)
By arguing as in Steps 1-2 in the proof of Lemma 2 we nd that in any solution to
the relaxed problem w0 = 0, q1 = 0, (IC20) and (IC12) bind; thus w2 = (1   q0)20
and w1 = (1   q2)[12 + (1   q0)20]. Now suppose that G is a solution to the relaxed
problem and such that 12 > 0. We nd G0 which is weakly better than G and satises
012 < 12. Let R
0(2) = R(2) + 2(1 p)
2 p ", R
0(1) = R(1)   p
2 p" and R
0(0) = R(0) with
" > 0 and small; thus 012 = 12   ", 020 = 20 + 2(1 p)2 p " and 012 + 020 = 12 +
20   p2 p". Furthermore, we set w02 = w2 + (1   q0)2(1 p)2 p " and w01 = w1   (1   q0) p2 p"
and q0n = qn for n = 0; 1; 2. First we verify that G
0 is feasible. Given that (16) holds
in G, it follows that (IC20) and (IC10) are satised in G0. On the other hand, (IC12)
reduces to w1   (1   q0) p2 p"  (1   q2)[12   " + w2 + (1   q0)2(1 p)2 p "] and we know
that w1 = (1   q2)(12 + w2) given that (IC12) binds in G. We need to prove that
(1  q2)["  (1  q0)2(1 p)2 p "]  (1  q0) p2 p". From inserting the binding (IC12) and (IC20)
into (IC10), we obtain (1   q2)[12 + (1   q0)20]  (1   q0)(12 + 20), which implies
1 q2  1 q0. Thus (1 q2)["  (1 q0)2(1 p)2 p "]  (1 q0)["  (1 q0)2(1 p)2 p "] and it turns
out that (1  q0)["  (1  q0)2(1 p)2 p "]  (1  q0) p2 p" holds. Regarding (BE), we nd that
the expected wage paid to the supervisor in G0 is the same as in G and the borrowers
expected payment is the same as in G; thus (BE) holds in G0 as it holds in G. Finally, the
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borrowerspayo¤ is the same in G0 as in G. In this way we have proved that whenever
the lending contract is such that 12 > 0, there exists another feasible contract which is
at least as good and has a smaller 12. Therefore we can nd a solution to the relaxed
problem by restricting our attention to contracts such that 12 = 0.
Given 12 = 0, we can argue like in the end of the proof of Step 3 in the proof of Lemma
2 to nd that (IC10) implies q2 = 0 and w1 = (1  q0)20. This implies that the incentive
constraints which have been neglected are satised. Therefore, in regime D there is no
loss of generality in considering only the contracts such that 12 = 0.
4. R(1)  R(0)  R(2): regime E.
We show that within the set of grand contracts such that R(1)  R(0)  R(2) the
best contract GE is such that RE(0) = RE(2); therefore, it belongs to regime D. Let
10  R(1)   R(0)  0 and 02  R(0)   R(2)  0. We study the relaxed program in
which we consider only (IC10), (IC12) and (IC02) among the incentive constraints:8><>:
(IC10) w1  (1  q0)(10 + w0)
(IC12) w1  (1  q2)(10 +02 + w2)
(IC02) w0  (1  q2)(02 + w2)
(17)
Suppose that G is feasible in the relaxed problem and such that 02 > 0. Then we nd G0
which is strictly better than G and satises 002 = 0. Precisely, let w
0
n = wn and q
0
n = qn
for n = 0; 1; 2 and R0(2) = R(2)+(1 p2)02, R0(1) = R(1) p202, R0(0) = R(0) p202;
then 002 = 0 < 02 and 
0
10 = 10. As a consequence, the incentive constraints in (17)
are weakly relaxed. Furthermore, the borrowers expected payment and the expected
wage bill are unchanged, thus (BE) is satised. Since R0(1) < R(1) and R0(0) < R(0),
Lemma 6 implies that the borrowerspayo¤ is larger in G0 than in G. Given 02 = 0
we can argue as in the proof of Step 1 in the proof of Lemma 2 and as in the analysis
of regime C in this proof of Lemma 3 to nd that w2 = 0, q1 = 0, w0 = 0 and q0 = q2,
w1 = (1   q0)10; this implies that the incentive constraints which have been neglected
are satised. This proves that GE satises 02 = 0.
Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose that a grand contract G = frS; rF ; w2; w1; w0; q2; q1; q0g is feasible and such that
rS < rF . Then we can nd G0 = fr0S; r0F ; w02; w01; w00; q02; q01; q00g which is feasible and
increases the borrowerspayo¤ with respect to G. Precisely, let r0S = r
0
F = r
e  prS +
(1   p)rF and w02 = w01 = w00 = 0, q02 = q01 = q00 = 0. Then (a) G0 satises all the
incentive constraints since  = 0; (b) the nancing cost with G0 is equal to 2, which is
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the minimum feasible cost and thus it cannot be larger than the cost under G; (c) the
borrowersexpected payment [the left hand side of (BE)] with G0 is the same as the one
with G. Hence G0 is feasible and the borrowerspayo¤ is 2[pYS   pre   (1   p) (re)].
The inequality 2[pYS   pre   (1   p) (re)] > 2[pYS   prS   (1   p) (rF )] is equivalent
to  (rF )    (re) > p1 p(re   rS) and we have p1 p(re   rS) = rF   re. Therefore, the
borrowerspayo¤ is higher in G0 than in G given that  0(r) > 1 for any r > 0.
Proof of Lemma 5
When  = 0, contract  satises (7) and is the optimal supervisory contract as
it generates a nancing cost equal to 2, which is the minimum feasible value. In the
following we consider the case of  > 0.
Given  > 0, we can argue like in Steps 1 and 2 of the proof of Lemma 2 to prove that
q2 = 0, w0 = 0 and (IC10) and (IC21) bind; thus w1 = (1 q0) and w2 = (1 q1)(2 q0).
Furthermore, (IC20) reduces to q1  f(q0), where f(q0)  q02 q0 is an increasing and convex
function such that f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1. The feasible set F for (q0; q1) is therefore
F =

(q0; q1) 2 R2+ : q0  1 and q1  f(q0)
	
. The total nancing cost is
Q(q0; q1) = 2+ p
2(1  q1)(2  q0) + 2p(1  p)[(1  q0) + kq1] + (1  p)2kq0
and no point in the interior of F minimizes Q since the Hessian matrix of Q is indenite
for any (q0; q1):
@2Q
@q20
=
@2Q
@q21
= 0 and
@2Q
@q0@q1
= p2 > 0
This violates the second order condition for a minimum, which requires the Hessian matrix
to be positive semi-denite.
We can neglect any point (q^0; 0) on the south boundary of F such that q^0 2 (0; 1) becauseQ
is linear in q0 and therefore minfQ(0; 0); Q(1; 0)g  Q(q^0; 0) for any q^0 2 (0; 1). Likewise,
we can neglect any point (1; q^1) on the east boundary of F such that q^1 2 (0; 1) because
Q is linear in q1. As a consequence, only (q0; q1) = (1; 0) may be a minimum point for Q
in the subset of F in which (IC20) is slack, and that corresponds to contract .
When also (IC20) binds, we have q1 = f(q0) and Q(q0; q1) is equal to
Q(q0)  Q[q0; f(q0)]
= 2+ p2[1  f(q0)](2  q0) + 2p(1  p)[(1  q0) + kf(q0)] + (1  p)2kq0
= 2+ 2p(1  p)kf(q0) + (1  p)2kq0 + 2p(1  q0)
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Since f is convex, also Q is so. Hence, Q is minimized at q0 = 0 if Q0(0)  0 (contract
), at q0 = 1 if Q0(1)  0 (contract ), at some q0 2 (0; 1) if Q0(0) < 0 < Q0(1). However,
q0 is such that Q
0(q0) = 0 which is equivalent to
@Q[q0 ;f(q

0)]
@q0
+
@Q[q0 ;f(q

0)]
@q1
f 0(q0) = 0. Since
f 0(q0) > 0, it must be the case that
@Q[q0 ;f(q

0)]
@q0
< 0 <
@Q[q0 ;f(q

0)]
@q1
, or @Q[q

0 ;f(q

0)]
@q0
 0 
@Q(q0 ;f(q

0)]
@q1
. In the rst case we do not have an optimal supervisory contract because it is
possible to reduce the cost by slightly increasing q0 above q0 and/or by slightly decreasing
q1 below q1 = f(q

0). The proof is completed by showing that the second case cannot
arise. Indeed, we nd
@Q
@q0
=  p2(1  q1)  2p(1  p) + (1  p)2k
@Q
@q1
=  p2(2  q0) + 2p(1  p)k
Then @Q
@q1
 0 is equivalent to k  p(2 q0)
2(1 p)  and this inequality implies
@Q
@q0
  p2(1  
q1)   2p(1   p) + 12p(1   p)(2   q0). The right hand side of the last inequality is
smaller than  p(1  p) < 0 for any (q0; q1) 2 [0; 1]2.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2(i)a-b appears in the text.
It is simple to verify that the neglected upward incentive constraints (IC12), (IC02), (IC01)
are satised by the two contracts described by Proposition 2(i).
Furthermore, we verify that YS is large enough to make the borrowerspayo¤ positive in
the optimal grand contract. For the state non-contingent contract described in (i)a, the
borrowerspayo¤ is 2pYS   2   2(1   p)[ ()   ] and A1(i) implies that this payo¤ is
positive. For the state-contingent contract described in Proposition 2(i)b, the borrowers
payo¤ is 2(pYS   pmaxI ) = 2pYS   2  (1  p2)k and is positive given A1(i).
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